In my last article, “Roadmap Revised – The Final Showdown”, I summarized the best avenues of conducting our internal struggle to remove the regime. For greater clarity, I will compare a couple of other options to remove the regime. And again, I encourage my writers to share their views on this critical issue.
Just to rouse your interest, let me review some of the opposition radio and internet propaganda thrown at us in the past few days. Their messages are the same, that the Ethiopian regime has neglected the Eritrean opposition camp and that the Ethiopian government should seriously reconsider assisting the opposition camp in vigorous manner. This is where my bewilderment continues – almost every opposition leader and party has camped outside PMMZ’s [PM Meles Zenawi] office for the last – count it – eight or more years without any success. Would a couple of appeals over the internet or radio work? I will return to this topic further down.
No one, and especially EDA, has managed to formulate a plan-of-action to remove the regime. We were told by EDA that it would devise a plan-of-action a year ago, and so far it hasn’t been able to come up with one. Imagine if EDA is this indecisive over a relatively simple task of devising a bold plan-of-action of removing a regime, it would surely bungle up the management of post-PFDJ Eritrea with its zillion issues.
But what is holding up the opposition camp? Let us examine the general composition and inclinations of the opposition camp,
§ Camp 1 – Those who advocate for internal struggle,
§ Camp 2 – Those who advocate for externally-assisted struggle,
§ Camp 3 – Do nothing, and their roles are simply to play musical chairs (i.e. don’t want to be left out)
Camp 1: Internal Struggle
I have already discussed one method of internal struggle in my last article, “Roadmap Revised – The Final Showdown”, and thus spare my readers from fully repeating it here.
What one can say is that we, ordinary Eritreans within the opposition camp, have let down our opposition leaders who strive to conduct our struggle against the regime through internal struggle. We have to reinvigorate our campaign to wage an effective internal struggle. This is not a rejection of EDA, which doesn’t have any plan-of-action to remove the regime, but a rejection of ‘doing nothing’. We aren’t expending our time and effort within the opposition camp to be lulled to sleep. We want to see change now, today, or even yesterday! The simple fact is that the opposition leadership is failing us and we shouldn’t be polite about it while our whole nation is going up flames. EDA isn’t a bride-to-be hidden in some backroom until the wedding day.
Camp 2: Externally-Assisted Struggle
‘Kab seb zitetsebeye bidewu beleye’, Or
‘Megedi Ente-tefa’eka, Gual Megedi Dile’
The main thrust of this article is to discuss this issue. Most of us don’t believe in ‘labeling’ anyone that opposes us or advocate for certain approach we disagree with. Everyone is entitled to their own personal or group opinions. But we shouldn’t shy away from expressing our heartfelt views and opinions. We leave ‘labeling’ to those belligerents who don’t have any positive messages or can’t articulate their views. As for us, i.e. those advocating for engaging solely through internal struggle, we have a message to convey.
Generally speaking, inviting a foreign power, esp. a neighboring one, to assist in regime change has its dangers. However, inviting TPLF to assist in our struggle carries an extra dimension of danger due to a number of factors.
§ Generally, the relationship between TPLF/Tigrayans and Eritrea is complicated due to shared history and ethnicity. It would be naïve not to think that our brothers and sisters to the South may cherish to carry out certain type of “pay back” for what they feel or perceive the way EPLF and the general population have treated them for decades.
§ In addition, the persistent view of Ethiopian people towards Eritrea creates the right climate for political manipulation against PMMZ. For some Ethiopians there is still a wrong belief that Ethiopia existed for three thousand years and that Eritrea is part of that history. For other Ethiopians, they still believe that Ethiopia has legitimate claim to access to sea, i.e. Assab.
Although PMMZ claims to believe in Eritrean independence and Eritrean sovereignty over Assab, and although I don’t doubt his ‘personal’ sincerity over these two issue, it would be naïve again not to think that if pressured into a corner in Ethiopian politics, PMMZ will use whatever the prevailing Ethiopian views are towards Eritrea to manipulate the political situations in Ethiopia. This view isn’t paranoia but only yesterday’s memory. It was only in 1998 that PMMZ kicked out over 80,000 Eritreans from Ethiopia for only one reason – for being of Eritrean ancestry, i.e. even those who don’t hold Eritrean identity card. There is no reason to believe that he won’t repeat this gross violation of human rights again against Eritreans. PMMZ will do what is necessary to maintain power – period. If PMMZ must invade Eritrean territory out of his own political quagmire and claim Assab, for instance, he will forget his yesterday’s pledge to respect Eritrean sovereignty in order to pacify or divert Ethiopian people’s attention away from domestic political turmoil. There is no reason to believe that PMMZ will put his power at risk to help Eritreans or out of personal convictions or some past pledges.
Even examining TPLF, there a number of factors to remember –
§ TPLF achieved its sole role within the Tigrayan struggle through internal ruthlessness just as Eritrean liberation movements,
§ TPLF continues, to this day, to pursue iron-hand administration in Tigray,
§ TPLF eliminated its one group of its leadership with the same tactics as our own only some five years ago,
In general, in a game of political power, for PMMZ & TPLF, the descending order of importance and priority are as follows,
- TPLF (secret and/or publicly known) leadership,
- TPLF cadres,
- TPLF rank-and-file,
- EPRDF (to control Ethiopia),
- Tigrayan people,
- Ethiopian people,
- Somewhere way down are the people and governments of neighboring countries,
- Further down are opposition groups of those neighboring countries – expendable group used as political tools and called up only when needed,
- Organizationally, TPLF is negatively viewed [putting it politely] within Ethiopia as the one that allowed Eritrea to secede.
- PMMZ is half-Eritrean (by origin) who is an easy political target within the Ethiopian politics. Any ‘perceived favor’ towards Eritreans will be viewed by Ethiopians yet another manifestation of ‘divided allegiance’.
- The May election has put PMMZ in precarious position. PMMZ can’t endanger his political power to help Eritreans.
- Even if PMMZ was to invade Eritrea for implicit ‘Eritrean cause’, PMMZ must be able to present to the Ethiopians the ‘Spoils of War’ – Assab, an advantageous redrawing of border – something to say to the Ethiopian people that he did it for the Ethiopian people. It is obvious that he won’t be able to use the political justification of building a democratic Eritrea when he has his own home-grown problems.
It should be noted that PMMZ might be able, supposing he does, to hide his agenda to help Eritreans from the Ethiopian public, but his problem will be his own cadres and rank-and-file TPLF who may use this situation to weaken him.
Eritrean opposition advocating for Ethiopian assistance are making a critical error of judgment in,
§ Wrongly believing that a good rapport with PMMZ alone will allow them to use Ethiopian resources against PFDJ. This is false. Unlike PIA, PMMZ must balance a number of factors. Moreover, PMMZ will pursue policies consistent with his own political agenda, and has nothing to do with what the opposition camp may whisper into his ears.
§ Wrongly believing that PMMZ and TPLF in general continue to enjoy the same absolute internal political and military power that they enjoyed in 1993 when Eritreans forced them to secede Eritrea in 1993. In 2006, TPLF is caught up in Ethiopian upheaval, which it must cautiously navigate.
§ The opposition camp assumes that PMMZ will favor those Eritrean opposition leaders who camp at his door. It may be just that PMMZ may have his own agenda or idea who should be leading the fight against or replace the PFDJ regime. Maybe, PMMZ wants to court the hard-to-get opposition groups. PMMZ may not be willing to dance to any tune fed from opposition leaders camping at his door, and who are bent to sit on the throne of power. Maybe PMMZ figures imposing Ethiopian-backed unpopular government on Eritreans would be tantamount to creating his Iraq next door. For Diaspora politicians, involving Ethiopia is about ‘all gain, but no pain’ – fighting PFDJ by remote control – if it succeeds they come to power, but if it fails, PMMZ, along with Ethiopians and Eritreans, will pay for the misadventure – not the Diaspora politicians. After all, for PMMZ, he would ask himself, what do these Diaspora politicians bring to the table if the Eritreans aren’t behind them. If removing PFDJ is PMMZ’s priority, there is no need to deal with either unpopular or unknown Diaspora politicians unless they can bring tangible contributions towards this campaign.
§ We are assuming that PMMZ is blood enemy of PIA. Maybe he is not! Or, maybe they hate each other but still need each other.
Just because certain opposition leaders and members desperately hope to use PMMZ against PFDJ doesn’t necessarily mean that PMMZ or TPLF will view the Eritrean issue from these opposition camp’s perceptive. This is only daydreaming. In fact, having failed to court PMMZ and camp over the last eight years, surely that this be a sign that something major is amiss. These group can keep camping and knocking at PMMZ’s door. But the question remains, what factors must change today that didn’t happen in the last eight years that will change PMMZ’s mind? The answer is simple, nothing! A struggle for regime change or democratic change can’t be attained through daydreaming. Their efforts are regrettably wasted – efforts that could have strengthened the internal struggle.
But this brings us to yet another question – probably the crux of the whole opposition politics that advocate for Ethiopian-assisted change. Why do these opposition groups and leaders pin their hopes on PMMZ only as if he is their only salvation? Why don’t they put their time and efforts to find alternative solutions, esp. to advocate for internal changes?
First, implicitly these opposition groups are telling us that it won’t be the Eritrean people that can bring about change. We can only deduce that they believe a change can only be effected through an armed struggle, which at this time must be fully aided by the Ethiopian regime. There message is that change can only be brought about by the barrel of a gun. If they have no confidence in the people of Eritrea, how do they expect to bring about democracy in Eritrea – spoon-fed, from top-down, from their benevolent government?
Second, and more specifically, why avoid the 100,000+ tegadelties? Is Camp 2 opposition ‘implicitly’ telling us that we can trust and work with TPLF, but not with our own tegadelites – our own citizens that must continue to play a role in Eritrea? If this writer has got this wrong, why don’t they explicitly tell us that they have a clear agenda to address tegadelties’ concerns? Why don’t they make explicit and repeated pledge to the 200.000+ Warsais that their services will be compensated? To me, the emphasis on Ethiopian assistance is a rejection of our own flesh-and-blood. Or is this that old paranoia that as the tegadelties and Warsais won’t accept us, we won’t accept them either … like those asylum-seekers in holes that I mentioned in my last article? I beg to differ, reaching out is all about leaving one’s paranoia and ego behind and to be the first one to extend one’s hand although one may be rejected and to say, ‘enough is enough’, ‘let bygones be bygones’ – let us leave a better legacy and Eritrea for our future generation. “Temeliska Etiredeo, Gedifkayo Aytieto”
If we don’t allow our wounds and hurt-feelings to heal, we will wreck the whole country. If we allow our feelings to drive our thoughts and our reasoning, then the only line-of-reasoning we accept is better both of us go down than see the other guy succeed. This is mutually assured destruction. The opposition politics can only be characterized as such at this time.
1. What does PFDJ must be ‘uprooted’ mean? PFDJ is dead. Definitely, PFDJ’s legacy should be erased from our history. In our propaganda to mobilize tegadelites, the use of the phrase, ‘uprooting PFDJ’ has a wider meaning. If I was a struggling tegadalay in Eritrea, I would ask myself, is the opposition trying to uproot me? What did I do – was it a crime to fight for my country’s independence? “Uprooting” is a typical [revolutionary] communist era words used to eliminate any class of society that are enemies of another class. Its definition is tied to indiscriminate elimination of those belonging to that particular group. Those radio and internet advocates who loosely use the word “uprooting” are calling for mass witch-hunt against over 100,000 Eritreans. This is the Eritrea they want to create – where instead of solutions are sought, problems are compounded. We have never seen where ‘uprooting’ has ever worked, other than to precipitate further chaos? We have to be selective in targeting our enemies. It ain’t about what we wish to do, but is most prudent to do.
2. What do they mean when they say that TPLF must view an alliance with Eritrean opposition as “strategic”? Does certain segment of the opposition camp’s need for strategic need with PMMZ translate into automatic reciprocal strategic need? At the risk of being repetitious, but for sake of emphasis, how is it that this segment of the opposition camp has been able to convince the PMMZ regime of the need for strategic alliance.
3. Some even advocate for the Ethiopian government to directly assist these certain opposition groups in building up their opposition army.
a. How long will this process take? Will this be simply a guerilla fight against a conventional army? Or, is this conventional warfare? What will be the objective?
b. What other solutions have this group proposed other than to jump to the sole conclusion that the only avenue is to pursue shedding blood to remove the regime?
c. Can any kind of military actions be undertaken through the DMZ?
d. Any TPLF direct and open assistance to the opposition camp and launched from Ethiopia is tantamount to Ethiopia starting war itself. Does PMMZ afford such provocation with Eritrea at a time of his own internal challenge?
e. Or is this just another macho talk that distracts us from the more difficult task of building an opposition force brick-by-brick?
4. It baffles one how Eritrean politics works. Thoroughly lacking diplomatic skills, and tinged with revolutionary mentality, whenever PIA is displeased with foreign country’s policy towards Eritrea, he resorts to belittling and turns belligerent towards that foreign country. In post-independence Eritrea, PIA has ridiculed France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the US and others.
We would have left this as PIA’s faut-pas if we hadn’t made the same observations within our opposition camp. When certain opposition groups got rejected by the TPLF, we are beginning to see varying degree of public belligerency against the regime. Naturally, politics is dirty and they can pursue any approach to get their message across. But my question is whether the public complaints and belligerency are designed to turn Eritrean public against the target person or group? Are we, ordinary Eritreans, instruments of hatred only – never told of anything until things fall apart. Then little dirty secrets are told when their hidden political agenda doesn’t go their way and then ‘le voila’ we are expected to act as we are told? This is called manipulation. Our questions to them, why don’t they use their energy for positive actions? The same observations can be made of opposition parties which get rejected by an alliance.
There are endless questions. Although we can’t pinpoint why each member of the opposition advocates for the Ethiopian-option, in general, the reasoning can’t be outside the purview of the above analysis.
My only request to CAMP 2 is, don’t come back and use PFDJ’s excuse – “Tegerihna”.
We are tired of that word.
The final question is, Camp 2 might say that they have the right to pursue their strategy as Camp 1 can do their own. In the last four years since the opposition camp expanded tremendously, the first order of business was to attempt to forge “Unity”. It was hoped that “Unity” in principle would lead to weaving together a broad based coalition that can pull its resources against PFDJ. With united opposition, and then with a clear plan-of-action, the fight was to be taken to PFDJ.
But instead, we are agonizingly witnessing backstabbing, and others writing endless series of articles with menacing titles that provoke the thought of religious war but wholly immersed with regurgitating yesterday’s garbage. Yet others threaten ordinary Eritreans because they participate in rally advocating for just cause of demarcation. Yet others ‘so-called democratic opposition’ threaten to use their little stick to prohibit certain opposition groups from campaigning in some of the neighboring countries. Others suspiciously playing double-game.
Why are we failing? This is simply because we are driven by reckless emotions and the need to be vindicated. Our so-called strategies are proposed with tenuous rationale and wholly designed to attain power at the expense of everything else. We have open and hidden agendas at the same time that are in direct conflict with each other.
Why are we failing? Because we waste time, effort and emotion trying to refute and to convince people who are set their ways. Leopard can’t change its spot! We are paralyzed by them although they are only handful of them. We get sidetracked by those whose contribution is to regurgitate yesterday’s garbage. As much as we wish to bring everyone onboard our opposition train, this isn’t realistic. Failing to do so, we must ignore the noise coming from our own extreme end and march forward. That is yet another price of freedom!
Defining political struggle – when one says we are struggling to bring about change of regime and beyond that struggling to establish democratic Eritrea – the very word ‘struggle’ has major significance. Political struggle isn’t against nature – drought, flooding, etc… - nor is it about diplomatic, nor financial struggle. By the very use of the word ‘struggle’, it signifies that we will always have challenges convincing a certain segment of the population to follow certain principle and course of action for the good of everyone. We are struggling to convince some who genuinely disagree with us, but we can always bridge our differences with these groups. Our biggest struggle is always how to handle those who purposely create discord among us. We have to learn to ignore them and remain focused on our struggle. We have to overcome our good-natured desire to bring everyone aboard, we have to stop questioning why everyone isn’t aboard with us. Struggle is also about articulating and then fine-tuning the political agenda within the same group that share the same aspirations. What Eritreans are experiencing with our government isn’t unique in man’s history. In fact, our experience is so common in human history that we must accept it almost as, unfortunately, unavoidable rite of passage towards a viable and stable democratic Eritrea. We struggled to win our independence against all odds. Even during our struggle for independence, we had discords among ourselves. We don’t approve of the way they resolved their differences. But the point is that regardless of that difference, we brought about our independence with our homegrown struggle. In today’s struggle for regime change and beyond, our struggle includes learning to bridge differences through reconciliation. To this end, our struggle is within each one of us - to fight that ego, hurt feeling, need for vindication, and overcome our unrealistic expectations. We will have won our political struggle once we are able to understand and overcome our own deep-down emotions.
We hope that EDA will be able to propose a viable plan-of-action in it next meeting. Failing to do so, and thus failing to provide leadership, the rest of us can’t simply sit and vegetate while our country is sinking into the abyss. EDA isn’t a bride-to-be hidden in some backroom until wedding day. EDA has had one long year to propose a plan, and the opposition camp has had over four years to do so. If EDA fails to put forward a viable plan-of-action, we should put forward our own proposals and pursue it. This is not a rejection of EDA as a good forum for direct ‘engagement’ or ‘inclusiveness’. We should reject any bashing of those who have different views from us. We should only have positive energy – one that is based on clear vision and clear strategy to win the confidence of Eritreans and to deal the final blow to the regime.
I hope my readers will be able to put forward their proposals for viable/workable plan-of-action.
In my opinion, there are certain opposition parties which believe in internal struggle and which we can work with. Let us give them our undivided support to them. EDA’s Charter may or may not be workable in post-PFDJ Eritrea. I have my own reservations towards it. But at this point, EDA’s Charter is irrelevant.
As stated in my last article, one proposal can be as follows,
1. “Coalition to remove PFDJ” – The name of the organization by itself would indicate the sole and simple purpose of the organization. This will be an all inclusive organization whose purpose is to coordinate, not usurp, all activities within the opposition camp. At this time, efforts are duplicated with every member of opposition pursuing their own agenda, resulting in conflicting messages and duplications of efforts.
2. This coalition must make the following pledges in order to address ordinary Eritreans’ concerns,
a. That the opposition camp considers the issue of pension for all tegadelties [ELF, EPLF, PFDJ] as its top priority. Pledge that no tegadalay will be deprived of his/her livelihood, including public housing.
b. That Warsai will be compensated fully for their services during the ‘Warsai-Yikealo’ Campaign. The next government will expend every effort to mobilize our youth immediately, and to rehabilitate and reintegrate them into the society.
c. Post-PFDJ government will immediately disengage from the rhetoric over the border issue. The next government will pursue legal and diplomatic means to resolve the border issue.
d. Special Courts will be dismantled immediately.
e. There will be no [indiscriminate] witch hunt against PFDJ members. However, those who have committed crimes, normally indictable under the current criminal laws of Eritrea, will face due-process of the law. We don’t have time nor energy to engage in witch-hunt.
f. The opposition camp will strive to establish a democratic government according to a certain timetable set by a transitional government established within one-year from the fall of the PFDJ regime.
3. Only one leader should be selected to lead take the fight to PFDJ. Would we create a one-man dictatorship within our coalition? But we can’t create a dictator within an organization that exists in Diaspora. Would this leader turn out to be dictatorial leader in post-PFDJ if he/she succeeds against PFDJ? If we start to factor many possibilities, the result will be paralysis. What we can be certain of is what is happening today, and our country is being tormented. Having examined all the possible future scenarios, we can only work on the one that is staring us down today. Let us not get ahead of ourselves too far.
We hope that EDA can come up with concrete action plan. Otherwise, it is time to mobilize ourselves and help those political organizations that espouse our concerns and share our chosen method of struggle.
It is worth to remember that whatever one does, there will be those who will clutter the airwave. Many of them may have legitimate concerns, and we should always address or at least remain sensitive to their concerns. Then there will be few subversive hands from both end of the spectrum who sole purpose to create chaos. Others will sit and wait hoping that we fail just to say ‘we told you so’ – but these are small people with confidence problem! We should not be distracted. Instead, we should remain focused on our positive agenda and plan-of-action. Rest assured that the vast majority of Eritreans share our positive aspirations and desires.
At the risk of being repetitious, but as this can’t be emphasized enough, “effort” is more than simply telling the Eritrean people how miserable their lives are under PFDJ. They don’t need to be told this because they are living through it. Some within the opposition camp already carry this message. Our messages and efforts should be,
§ Continuously telling them they must rely on themselves to bring about change, and beyond that …
§ Continuously telling them how they can bring about change, and beyond that…
§ Continuously telling them that change is for the better and not about vendettas, witch-hunt, and beyond that …
§ To provide with clear leadership, with one person embodying our message, and uncluttered and simple message – that the next government’s immediate interest is in implementing the rule-of-law, disengaging from the threat of border war, and protecting the well-being of every Eritrean without any prejudice – and then to establish a transitional government that will put Eritrea on path toward democracy and beyond that …
§ To formulate a clear and widely understood strategy and plan of action that will move the opposition along a deliberate path towards change, and beyond that …
§ To understand that in this political campaign, there can’t be hidden political agenda, and beyond that …
Keep up the faith and stay focused, it is darkest before the dawn!
Berhan Hagos
April 8, 2006
