Eritrea’s challenge remains how to transform itself from the armed struggle mentality that brought about independence to a political system that will foster a viable and stable democratic Eritrea, which we all aspire for.  There are many excuses why Eritrea is still a long-way from achieving the status of mature democratic state.  Some argue that the large population remains uneducated, still tied to rural life, legacy of our colonizers and now a brutal regime, division within our society, etc… But all these are simply excuses.  The most important cornerstone of democratic societies is the rule-of-law, which has always been practiced by our forefathers.  The current breakdown in the rule-of-law in Eritrea, and even within the opposition camp, is not a growing pain towards creating democratic institutions in Eritrea, but rather a regression from our centuries of tradition and history of stable, fair, and law-abiding Eritrean society. 

Some argue that armed campaign is needed to bring about change.  But there are no solid arguments, both as principle and as strategy, to pursue such campaign in our specific situation – even for rhetorical purposes.  One justification for advocating such armed campaign is that the political campaign has been weak in removing the regime.

First, this justification is incorrect in that the political campaign has been very effective in isolating the regime and thus bringing it closer to its downfall.  In principle, pursuing armed campaign to resolve internal conflicts sheds the blood of the innocents, and secondly creates dangerous precedence for resolving internal challenges.  Even as strategy, there is no reason to believe that an armed campaign will achieve any more success than a political campaign.  In fact, armed campaign may breath new life to the regime by creating further excuses of ‘instability’ within Eritrea to continue its undeclared ‘state-of-emergency’.    To the contrary, the absence of any kind of ‘insurgent based armed conflict’ will only lead to discontent from idle and underpaid servicemen who wonder why they are made to rot in the middle-of-nowhere.  However, if the opposition camp pursues armed campaign, the regime will find justification to keep the servicemen in the army.  Guess what, the servicemen will then first and foremost blame ‘armed insurgents’ for keeping them in the army.  The regime will keep reminding the servicemen that they can’t be demobilized because the ‘armed insurgents’ are jeopardizing the security of the country.  As a result, the servicemen’s frustration will be directed more towards the ‘armed insurgents’, and less towards the regime that is keeping them in bondage.

The second justification or call for pursuing armed struggle is that the opposition camp has been weak in pursuing its political campaign.  It is illusionary to expect weak political campaigners to transform themselves to strong armed campaigners.  Others might call for new breed to take up ‘batons or sticks’ to find solution to our woes.  But this is short-sightedness.  The phrase, ‘winning the war, but losing the peace’ is probably telling under this situation.  To argue that simply removing the PFDJ regime is a solution is naiveté.

It is important that we learn from our past mistakes, and to use that as springboard to gain the right momentum in establishing a viable nation.  Instead of advocating for alternative means to remove the regime, we should debate how the political campaign can be made even more effective.  The significance of September 18^th is that thousands of Eritreans refused to kneel down to the regime and pursued political campaigns to demand political reforms.  This strategy is never a mistake, and doesn’t need augmentation in the form of armed campaign to achieve its objectives.  As a result of the bravery of the fallen and imprisoned heroes in their political campaign, the vast majority of Eritreans and the whole world has shut down the regime.  No one can deny that PFDJ’s latest and increased acts of desperation are simply reflections of the tightening noose around its neck.  Imagine Mr. Naizghi Kiflu waving the white flag!   The regime is getting so desperate to keep the insatiable army officer that it must now resort to handing out ‘Pensiones’ [or mini-motels] from private businessmen and giving it to them in its losing bid to keep them satisfied. 

In politically volatile situations like Eritrea, we will wake up one morning to find that the ordinary people of Eritrea have forced the PFDJ plane down, saying that we have had enough.  Finally, we will have crossed the bridge from armed struggle mentality of yesteryear to people’s movement of the future of Eritrea.  There is no such thing as shortcut to achieving the most valuable and precious things in life.

It is interesting to note that those furthest from the fire, from a safe distance, are the ones advocating for adding fuel to the fire.  It is understandable for many of us to feel frustrated and helpless watching our fellow Eritreans in Eritrea and in refugee camps suffer in their everyday life.   For us Eritreans, every one Eritrean that is wasted on the streets of Asmara, in Wia, Sahara Desert, or the Mediterranean Sea is a piece of us that is buried with him/her.  But it is in adverse situations and trying times, that we should remain focused.  We should not lose sight of our overall objective. 

Opposition Camp’s Weak Political Campaign

Among the various articles written on the internet, it is difficult to find any kind of analysis, suggestions, or recommendations on how to address the various challenges faced within the opposition camp generally and specifically EDA in any systematic manner.    In previous article, I had given three defining issues that EDA has failed to address.

In my opinion, EDA has now failed on the fourth defining issue that I had mentioned in the same article regarding the handling of EPM.  The purpose of  this article is not to blame exclusively EDA, Adhanom’s EPM or Abdella’s EPM. 

The most important question the rest of us should ask is what should have been done to resolve this conflict, esp. EDA vs. [dissenting] EPM.  The question should be what would have been done if properly working political institutions were functioning.   Instead, the internet is awash with all kinds of comments or criticisms by writers who consider themselves to be ‘insiders’ or ‘connected’.   Many others base their comments on what they know personally or in the grapevine about Mr. Adhanom, Mr. Abdella, or Mr. Khalifa in the past rather than on facts based on this particular situation only.   This type of haphazard analysis will get us nowhere in attempting to build tomorrow’s democratic Eritrea. 

To reiterate, the question should be what should EDA have done to address the EPM issue.  What do we mean by applying institutional-approach or systematic conflict resolution mechanism to resolve the EDA-EPM issue?  I don’t believe that this line-of-reasoning is lost with our opposition leadership, and within the opposition camp in general.  It should not be lost with us that structured way of engaging political campaigns will take away much of the discretionary power that politicians, including our opposition leaders, seek to attain and maintain.  Politicians are averse to openness as Dracula is to sunshine.  Openness in our political campaigns will raise questions, for instance, as to why certain opposition groups are located in Addis Ababa, in a country that maintains a formal ‘State of War’ against our country and against every Eritrean – a very difficult one to answer indeed.  When opposition groups are uncomfortable with their own policies and actions, the preferred method of political campaign is to close like a clam.  But this is self-defeating!  It is not political campaign that is failing, but the opposition politicians.

How should dissenting members of EPM have presented their case?