‘Ab Wigi’e zeywua’le belih’
Some continually ask why did the reformers allow PIA to monopolize power when they knew very well what PIA is capable of.
When EPLF walked into Asmara on May 24th, 1991, it was strictly a military organization. Naturally, although there were some frictions at the top, the leadership remained very secretive. The rank-and-file largely regarded the EPLF leadership as one cohesive group – with PIA at the helm.
On May 24th, 1991, Eritreans inside and outside went into euphoria. After thirty years of what seemed insurmountable odds, Eritrea gained its independence. All our ills had gone away forever. Nearly every Eritrean wanted or did marry their [especially] daughters to our heroes - tegadelties. PIA was revered as symbol of Eritrean independence. PIA was untouchable. Everyone remembers how much Eritreans held their breath until PIA returned to Eritrea from his medical treatment after near death with deadly form of [cerebral] malaria in 1993. Every resident of Asmara lined up the streets of Asmara to greet PIA. If memory serves me right, Min. Ali Seid Abdella suffered the same illness but nobody remembers that – no points for second best. That is the whole point, nobody really cared except for our symbolic hero. For most us, any of those we see in the picture above were simply side-kicks to our hero.
Let us start counting the years . . .
Whether the reformers could have controlled PIA’s powers during the armed struggle would simply be a futile game of second-guessing and Monday quarterbacking. As the old adage would say, ‘Ab wugi’e zeywea’le belih’.
Let us proceed to post-liberation period …
The reformers couldn’t have played their politics against our hero between 1991 and 1993 because open political infighting would have endangered our official independence. Two years [1991- 1993] down!.
At the EPLF's Third Congress in February 1994, one of the most popular Shaebia figures among rank-and-file – and one of the most practical leaders, Mr. Mesfin Hagos, received the second highest number of votes for election to the Central and Executive Committees, reportedly only one less than PIA. Unfortunately, being second isn’t good enough to replace PIA. Further one year [part of 1993 – part of 1994] down. At that time, the positive outcome from the 3rd Congress was the commitment to draft and ratify the constitution by 1997.
If the reformers had tried to replace PIA in an illegal manner during the drafting of the Constitution [1994 – 1997], the public backlash would have been very easy and understandable to predict. The new leaders would have been labeled as anti-democratic forces and the consequences would have been obvious. The only choice, and it was the best choice, was to allow the Constitution to be drafted and ratified. If PIA didn’t implement the Constitution, PIA risked backlash at which time reformers would have gained upper hand to press PIA to abide by Central Committee and National Assembly resolutions. From 1994 to 1998, most, if not all, of the reformers didn’t and couldn’t predict that there would be a conflict with Woyane that would eventually consume the whole nation.
Soon after the Constitution was ratified in May 1997, the reformers wouldn’t have been able to take matters into their own hands without public backlash. Had the reformers taken action against PIA soon after ratification while awaiting implementation, the whole public and grassroots tegadelti would have accused the reformers of being power-hungry, impatient – and thus dangerous. Even those who had some discomfort and suspicion of PIA’s modus operandi, would have been the first to accuse the reformers of subverting all principles of peaceful and legal transitions. Over three years [parts of 1994 – 1997] down.
In May 1998, the disastrous war against Ethiopia was lashed upon us. It is no secret that there were major disagreements over the cause and handling of this issue among the top Eritrean leaders. The possible causes of this conflict have been speculated and discussed eloquently by many writers on the internet over the years. The bottom line is that if the reformers had attempted to remove PIA at a time when Eritrean sovereignty was in jeopardy, it would have been the public that would have condemned the reformers – as traitors, and working for Woyane. It is no doubt, PIA would have relished that. But the wisdom of the day was, ‘let us handle external threats today, and deal with domestic issues later.’ From mid-1998 to mid-2000 when the Cessation of Hostilities was signed – 2 years [ parts of 1998 – 2000] down, and to Algiers Agreement at end of 2000 – another half-year [ rest of 2000] down.
It is obvious that prevailing public attitude and timing was stacked against the reformers. With the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities in June 2000, our agenda returned to what Eritrea must do to re-embark on its journey to a prosperous and viable nation. When the June 2000 Cessation of Hostilities was signed, PIA knew that the Central Committee and National Assembly will hold him accountable for his actions. Simultaneously, the reformers knew that in trying to run away from his responsibilities and accounting for his actions during the war with Ethiopia and even for acts leading up to the war, that PIA would resort to his trademark without any delay.
In August 2000, Min. Haile Woldetensae made his often quoted, timely and wise speech outlining the vision of many of his colleagues and many other Eritreans to embark on the road to recovery and beyond. A speech PIA can’t live down. This was followed by the Berlin Manifesto, then PFDJ’s counter propaganda, followed by very open protest by the jailed reformers.
Could the reformers have replaced PIA forcefully between June 2000, and especially between December 2000 of the Algiers Accord to the time of their arrest in September 2001 – a period of barely nine months? Had the reformers removed PIA by force – an action that would have been labeled as coup, although in reality it is PIA who is holding to power by the force and effect of coup, the vast majority of us would have said,
1. How could the reformers do something like this at a time when our nation is being threatened by an external enemy – and esp. Woyane which just adds a notch up to our feelings.
2. Why didn’t the reformers wait until the border decision, which was announced in April 2002 – some 7 months after their arrest?
3. The reformers would have been accused of being power hungry as PIA – ready to use any illegal means to attain it as PIA had done to maintain his power.
At this time, there were still many within the army and the public who strongly supported PIA – especially at a time of ‘real or perceived’ external threat. If the reformers had resorted to illegal acts, they risked a high probability of plunging the whole country into civil war, at a time, when the external threat was still real and the UNMEE had not been fully deployed.
In the end, those who betrayed the reformers are their colleagues, and to a lesser extend the rest of us. In August and September 2000, the Central Committee and National Assembly passed resolutions requiring the Eritrean government to proceed with business of running of a nation – including holding elections at end of 2001, and to promulgate Elections and Multiparty laws. For example, the National Assembly had 150 members. At least 76 members must have voted in favor of these resolutions to pass. How come only 15 of these reformers stand their grounds while the others backtrack? To me, that is betrayal! The G-15 stood their grounds, the others caved in for their own survival and thus exposing Eritrea to what we are witnessing today.
The G-15, and especially G-11, journalists, and thousands of other political prisoners could have shut their mouths and pretended to bow their heads to our President-for-Life as the rest of their colleagues are doing. The jailed reformers could have been breathing fresh air over the miseries of their people. But they chose to go to jail – worse than death – for their own people, and for their beliefs. There is no higher calling, there is no more bravery, there is no higher love of one’s country than to sacrifice personal comfort for others. These are my heroes! These are our heroes! If the rest of us did even a fraction what the reformers and other brave Eritreans political prisoners are doing by sacrificing themselves for their beliefs, their people, their country, Eritrea wouldn’t have fallen to a deep hole that it finds itself today.
. . . AFTER COUNTING THE YEARS, in reality the reformers had barely nine months to act – and act they did. We have had four years to act since their arrest – and what do we have to show for it - we have failed them, our people, and our country miserably.
We should thank the Reformers for their wisdom of NOT resorting to what would have amounted to a coup to remove PIA. That would have led to possible civil war, and definitely a dangerous precedence that would have sunk Eritrea into deeper hole. Instead, the reformers chose to pursue reform through legal means, and to involve their colleagues and the general public. This strategy, which is rooted in both honorable and practical belief, is never a mistake. If we are questioning or second-guessing their pursuit of legal means, then we are advocating for engaging in the same illegal acts as PFDJ – acts that could have led to disaster. The only way to avoid disaster is to do what the reformers did – to stand up collectively [en masse] for our rights. Our collective thoughts, our collective efforts should be on how to unite, how to pool together our resources, and how to mobilize the people to stand up for their rights and freedoms – without complicating with untimely, regardless of how important, issues. This is the only long-term guarantee against dictatorships.
Just to reiterate for emphasis a point raised above, some Monday quarterbacks may ask, could the reformers have been more aggressive in mobilizing the public against the regime in those 9 months mentioned above? The answers are very simple and for us to see. It is obvious and as we have already witnessed, PIA didn’t and will not sit idle while his antagonists engage in mobilizing the people for reforms. But it is just as important to learn the lessons of the past four years (i.e. since the reformers arrest) within the opposition camp pertaining to mobilizing the public, in that putting in motion public resistance is one huge task that requires time – time that the reformers didn’t have. As such they chose to lead us by their examples. Self-sacrifice is bravery above all else!
Heroes are never forgotten. Even if our heroes are out-of-sight six feet under or in jail, they are never out of our minds. Their invisible hand reaches further, and their shadow casts bigger – keeping our antagonists sleepless at night until finally driven out. It is their coward colleagues who are in our sights, but out-of-our minds … and out-of-our hearts.
On last thought
"Little minds think and talk about people.
Average minds think and talk about things and actions.
Great minds think and talk about ideas."
- Benjamin Franklin
Some pseudo-oppositions’ contribution to our the opposition camp is to write innuendoes about our dedicated leaders , especially ex-PFDJ and RC. As Benjamin Franklin wisely said, these type of people have little minds. Great minds need not talk about people – rather they think and talk about ideas. Let us debate, argue, and disagree – only over ideas. That is the only way to get results – results we haven’t seen in at least the last four years!
Next: Meseretawi Hitotat Part IV: Succession & Institutions
Berhan Hagos
August 17, 2005
