1. Presence of foreign nationals within the democratic movement
Foreigners having direct lines of authority from outside.
Foreigners having no direct lines of authority from outside.
a. Transparency (building trust and support from the public)
b. Disarming manipulations
2. Active participation of military forces in political change
1. Presence of foreign nationals within the democratic movement
The fourth factor which is mentioned by Helvey[1] as a possible contaminant, but debated by many, is the Presence of foreign nationals within non-violent democratic movements. Most importantly, for Helvey, the contaminant nature of this factor lies in publicizing the participation of foreign nationals in the domestic component of a political struggle. True that, given the limitation that most non-violent movements face, assistance by foreign assistance is unavoidable. This situation is evident in most African countries like, Eritrea, which continually had and have been under strains from producing skilled manpower in variety of areas.
Even if there are citizens, those movements may lack the incentive to attract national skilled man power to run the smooth flow of a non-violent struggle approach to democratic order. Again, even if it happens, it may not happen all the time, thus, leaving no option for non-violent movements except to rely on foreigners for assistance, mainly a technical one. However, this option is not with out its shortcomings: it could weaken and, even maim the movement if it is not handled with the necessary precautions. To redress this inadequacy, Helvey suggests that the assistance by foreigners should readily be acknowledged or even as a matter-of-factly characterized by the movement as opposition requested technical assistance which has no line of authority. The rationale for quickly acknowledging the assistance from foreign nationals is not difficult to comprehend; and the initiative of taking the step is a sound measure which has to be adhered consistently by non-violent movements dispensed in situations like that of ours.
Acknowledging the involvement of foreign nationals is done mainly for two reasons. The first one is to show and prove transparency with in the movement and, thereby, build up trust and belongingness with in the participants of the movement and the population at large. Besides, as far as possible, members of any strategic movement should be provided with as much information as possible in order to rationally judge the competence of their leaders and the competence and possible special interests of any foreign technical advisers to the leadership. The second reason is to avoid manipulations by the challenged political regimes.
As experienced in many African countries, most violent movements tend to lack the investment which is necessary to create a foundation for the post-struggle political system. In most instances, they tend to focus on the mere fact of changing the existing order with out preparing a platform for a new and sustainable democratic order. Armed or violent movements are seen putting much trust on power or force amassed for change, thus, lacking the necessary trust-ingredient of non-violent ways of dispute resolution and resource utilization in all walks of life. This, however, is not the case with non-violent movements. More importantly, non-violent movements tend to rely on the over all measures taken by the public at large for victory and change. The movement solely serves as a guide. It is here, therefore, that the technical know how is imperative.
As Shepherd notes, the growth of a human rights–based civil society must come first before democracy can emerge.[2] And as democracy is a function of so many factors, including the existence separation of powers, strong and independent media and civil societies, etc., seeking assistance from foreign nationals might be unavoidable if there are no qualified citizens on technically required areas. In today’s stage of globalization, nations have become more and more interdependent than ever, so do are individuals. Irrespective of their stage of development and political systems, there is not a single state that could fill gaps in what ever business it is engaged or has achieved a momentous level of development (for instance political development) with out looking for assistance from foreigners. The contribution of Jews and Russians in politics, science and technology in United States is one among the many examples. In our case, in one way or the other, we had so many foreigners who positively contributed to wards the liberation struggle, be it in the military, health or other areas. Prof. Fred Hollows (Australian) could be mentioned as one of the many examples; he had technically contributed immensely towards the realization of the liberation struggle. Due to his contribution, many were saved from total blindness before and after independence.
Secondly, the adoption of a general policy of transparency as to the participation of foreign nationals in a strategic nonviolent movement can do much to disarm arguments of the government that any achievements of the opposition are due to the decisions of foreign nationals. This has been evident in our country, Eritrea. As we all are well aware of, let alone during involvements of foreign nationals, the Eritrean government has been repeatedly attempting to irresponsibly arm itself against moves taken by citizens who are critical of the overall policies of the government. A concrete example of this the attempts persistently made at labeling journalists and university students as adherents and puppets of the G15, who have been in prison since 2001 for allegedly compromising the country’s sovereignty.
To sum up, the participation of foreign nationals with in the domestic component of a political struggle, especially those having lines of authority from outside, is believed to have a pollutant effect on non-violent struggles or movements if discovered by the public. In those instances, even if a technical assistance is needed, Helvey does not agree in them being public issues. On the other hand, however, if assistance is required from foreign nationals it’s line of authority has to be screened and proved and, then, their involvement has to be readily acknowledged and noted as technical requested assistance. This could enable the movement show transparency with it and avoid ill conceived manipulations by and disarm the government.
2. Active participation of military forces in political change
Undoubtedly the use of force is destructive. That is why Helvey puts it as a very possible contaminant of non-violent movements. Emphasizing on the effect of use of arm on development, the then US secretary of State, Alexander Haig, declared in June 1981, that ‘the economic and political growth which goes along with the process of development cannot take place in an environment characterized by violence’.[3] In reiterating this view by way of examples, Terry Lynn Karl stated that Latin American democracies that endured for a considerable length have been the ones founded through “pacts” among…groups that recognize each other, compromise, and “define the rules of governance on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those involved[4], and not through evolving arms. As they do fall with in the ambit of the whole process of development there fore, non-violent movements could fall short of achieving their objective as forefront actors.
As again noted by Helvey, it is difficult enough for the military establishment to avoid involvement in a domestic political struggle, especially if the government leadership is perceived to be legitimate by election and that leadership, citing constitutional authority, commits military forces against the political opposition. This submission, however, doesn’t always hold true in Africa. Even if the leadership is not a result of election, the likelihood that governments commit the military to weaken movements or political oppositions is there in place. In as much as staying in power does not prove legitimacy, illegitimate governments have persistently used the military to consolidate their power and dismantle political oppositions. This becomes more evident especially when the movement becomes stronger. As a last gasp effort, desperate attempts of strengthening military might and massively committing the military had been used by the Derg government of Ethiopia against the then coalition opposition movements of Ethiopia and our struggle for independence.
The above example is a sole example. The post-colonial history of the whole Africa has been a mix of violence and counter violence. The situation in the great lakes region provides a good example. Mobuto’s use of the military to squash his political oppositions was increasing from time to time with the opposition movements getting more and stronger. The atrocities committed in Rwanda provide complex but clear example, the use of the military and commission of international crimes was increasing with the movement led by Kagame getting more and more visible and stronger.
The above instances again are not only peculiar to violent movements. Given the situation in which it was being exercised, the struggle against Apartheid in Africa was not an armed movement at the beginning; it was a nonviolent approach of struggle for democracy. Therefore, even with nonviolent movements, the likelihood that the Government could be using force or the military to silence them should, at the very least be considered. Because, as Helvey notes, once the military takes sides in a domestic political struggle, even for the most democratic causes, the likely hood of its being committed to armed struggle against a major segment of the population increases, and with it, increases the possibility of bloodshed or unlawful seizure of power. And, once the military seizes power in the pretext of providing transition, order could lay at the tip of a gun, and the transition may last for long. Obviously, neither of the above benefits a nonviolent movement. That is why it is strongly advisable for opposition efforts to discourage the armed forces from participating in a war against its own citizens at the earliest stage.
When it comes to the situation of our country it suffices to mention the incident of 1994; as we all Eritreans recall, the government used the military to kill some of the participants and disband the demonstration in Mai Habar, Eritrea, when war veterans and disabled fighters attempted to peacefully demonstrate seeking for the fulfillment of their right. They were brutally attacked. This, therefore, puts any initiative of opposition, even the most nonviolent ones, in a disadvantaged position for attacks from the government unless the necessary precaution is taken from the beginning. The Eritrean Government will not hesitate to force the military to point its gun against its own citizens. Therefore, as we Eritrean can’t afford to loose our beloved ones any more the first strategy for nonviolent movement like that of ours, the EMDHR, should be to discourage the military from using its arm against its own citizens. The movement should initiate and develop its network with, and show its peaceful and democratic ideologies to the military. Then, the military needs to be thought to avoid committing itself against its brothers and sisters. Because, if it does, it could maim the lofty objectives of a nonviolent movement.
[1] See Robert L. Helvey On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about the Fundamentals (2004) 220-221.
[2] See George W. Shepherd ‘Forward: Democracy and Human Rights, a New Era?’ in Campbell and Mahoney-Norris Democratization and the Protection of Human Rights: Challenges and Contradictions (1998) IX.
[3] See Jamil Salmi Violence and Democratic Society: New Approaches to Human Rights (1993) 119.
[4] Zahra F. Arat Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries (1991) 2.
