The purpose of this article is to engage the Eritrean public, and to encourage Eritreans to debate the current challenges facing the opposition camp.
A recent comment by an opposition leader that the opposition camp has not been effective at mobilizing the Eritrean public should give us an added impetus to reflect on this challenging issue.
Four months after the formation of EDA, we have not yet seen any declared plan-of-action to wage an effective campaign against the regime. ‘Zigebir Nediu [N’Adiyu] Neynegir’ can’t work in a political campaign. To date, the public’s negative reaction towards the regime has emanated from the regime’s blatant abuse of the rule-of-law and basic human rights, rather than the opposition camp’s effective campaign against it.
While there is a proliferation of opposition political parties within Diaspora opposition camp, the bulk of the campaign against the regime has come through individual efforts such as the following sources:
- Internet media: Meskerem.net, Asmarino.com, Awate.com and other independent/private media have played significant role in disseminating information and exposing human rights abuses in Eritrea,
- Advocacy groups: such as EHDR-UK and EPDS, have exerted valiant efforts to address and expose the plights of Eritrean refugees and to expose human rights abuses in Eritrea. Ms. Chyrum’s continued efforts to address the plights of Eritrean refugees in Libya and South Africa is exemplary.
[http://www.dhnet-eritrawian.com]
- Radio Broadcast: a couple of opposition groups, some more effectively than others, have waged a campaign again the regime by broadcasting into Eritrea. Voice of Liberty is doing a marvelous job in its content, timeliness, and delivery.
This compels us to ask the question, what is the role of the vast majority of the political opposition parties in removing the regime?
PART I: Profile of Eritrean Public
Group – 1: Eritreans exiled before independence
Eritrean exodus began in 1960’s. When Eritreans were forced to leave their homeland, they severed their ties from the colonizers knowing fully that return to their homeland would have severe consequences. In their adopted countries, these Eritreans engaged in opposition activities without hesitation as they had no expectation of returning to Eritrea as long as foreign colonizers ruled Eritrea. The opposition, or rather Eritreans seeking their rightful independent homeland, campaigned hard with their time and money to remove the colonizers. Finally independence arrived in May 1991. Suddenly Diaspora Eritreans were able to return to their homeland again.
In post-independent Eritrea, (this group of) Diaspora Eritreans find themselves in yet another dilemma. Just as they were becoming comfortable visiting Eritrea for various reasons, the internal political situation deteriorates putting them in new predicaments. A large number of this group of exiles are probably approaching retirement and might be contemplating returning to Eritrea. Others feel that they have already paid the heavy sacrifice of not visiting their homelands for decades during the colonization of Eritrea. The siblings of this group were born or grew up in Diaspora and thus, generally speaking, do not have full grasp of the current abusive political climate in Eritrea compared to those who must live under the tyranny of the current regime.
Many of those exiled before independence era include former fighters of the struggle for independence.
The opposition political groups must cater their messages and actions to reflect this group’s concerns. This group may not be willing to engage in public opposition against the regime, but may be counted on to assist financially through anonymous payment system. Opposition groups must continually explain in their websites [in various Eritrean languages] how these Eritreans can make anonymous financial assistance and other subtle ways of resisting the government (e.g. not attending PFDJ meetings, etc…).
Group 2 – Recently Exiled Eritreans
This group mostly consists of young Eritreans who largely left Eritrea through the Sudan or South Africa. It is said that the first victim of war is innocence. Members of Group 2 grew up in independent Eritrea – an Eritrea that should have lived peacefully for thousands of years. Our youth lost their innocence barely after they were able to walk. Most find themselves in the same situation as their older generation Eritrean exiles who severed their ties from their colonized country and its colonial leaders, and felt that they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by waging their struggle against their colonizers and oppressors.
Most of those young Eritreans that left Eritrea after independence can’t return to Eritrea without facing severe consequences dished out by the ruthless PFDJ regime. They have little or nothing to lose if they campaigned publicly against the regime. This is the group that must be nurtured and harnessed if an effective campaign is to be waged against the regime.
In order to nurture and harness the energy of this group, we must first understand their shock, disgust, and despair against a government/regime of our own that all of us (and especially our kids) thought would usher in a new and prosperous era, rather than committing atrocities never seen before – especially against our youth. For many youth, they are trying hard to reconcile their disappoints of the ‘New and Independent’ Eritrea against their natural attachment to their homeland. This is the time they need guidance and understanding. The youth of today are far more sophisticated, able to discern subjective politics, and reject ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend politics’. Despite their disgust at the PFDJ regime, and although in discussions they claim to not want to have any dealings with Eritrea, deep down they want to do something for the family and friends they left behind, literally only few weeks or months earlier. Despite their anger, they can’t turn their backs against their beloved in Eritrea. Group 2 can’t severe their ties.
Unfortunately, the opposition political camp is so dominated by the political dynamics of yesteryears, it has not been able to reinvent itself to address new realities and situations. The opposition camp has to-date failed to tap into this group to invigorate the opposition camp.
Group 3 – Eritrean Opposition Within Eritrea
One can safely say that due to PFDJ’s abuse of the rule-of-law and human rights, and accentuated with spiraling living expenses and domestic and international political mess, the vast majority of Eritreans are united in their desire to remove the regime.
In today’s Eritrea, over 50% of the population is under 18-years old, and 2/3 of the population is under 25-years old – typical of developing countries. This means that 2/3 of the Eritrean population was too young, or barely old enough, to remember May 24th, 2001 – let alone the bitter period of struggle for independence.
The politics of yesteryears is historical for significant segment of this group. The only flag they know is the official one. Those who can mobilize this group are those who can speak their language.
PART II: Shifting Gears for Effective Political Campaign
Unlike the struggle for independence which was largely an armed campaign, the current campaign to remove the regime is a political one. In an armed campaign, milestones and tangible results can be achieved. In contrast, political campaign is far more challenging.
In order to mobilize the various groups within the Eritrean public, the Eritrean opposition camp’s platforms, principles, views, actions, expectations, membership, and leadership must reflect current realities as much as possible – not what it should be, and definitely not what it was twenty five years ago.
The biggest obstacle to ‘genuine’ united opposition remains rooted in our struggle of independence. I will point out one of the excess baggage of yesteryears.
When EDA or other opposition groupings’ meetings are held without the presence of the official Eritrean flag, the majority of Eritreans misunderstand opposition politics and platforms, although the opposition’s message might be closer to the public’s views. Many Eritreans, who have accepted or known only the official flag, feel that rejecting the official Eritrean flag is tantamount to rejecting free and independent Eritrea.
Although, certain opposition groupings’ rejection of the official Eritrean flag might be a symbolic campaign against PFDJ, their rationale for rejecting it is not understood by vast majority of Eritreans. Instead, these opposition groups could have waged a more effective campaign against PFDJ if they adopted the internationally recognized Eritrean flag as an official one but claim that the official flag was not adopted through a transparent, legal, and democratic process. In doing so, the opposition would send an effective message to Eritreans,
§ That they are not caught up in politics of yesteryears, which correctly or incorrectly, which might be viewed as ‘bah aybelom’ politics,
§ That the illegal acts of the PFDJ regime will not be reversed by the opposition groups own illegal acts in its passionate politics of yesteryears,
§ [conversely] that decrees and laws promulgated, including the adoption of Eritrean official flag, by the present regime, no matter how illegal they may have been, will be honored or will be reversed in an open, legal and transparent manner by a post-PFDJ government.
This means that the public must feel confident that the opposition groups are able to overcome their yesteryears politics, and that they are able to overcome their passionate politics, which if not identified and checked, could lead to the same irrational and illegal acts we are experiencing under the PFDJ regime. Failing to accept the official Eritrean flag has another symbolic significance. By refusing to accept the official Eritrean flag although knowing fully that this gesture could advance the rapprochement between the public and the opposition groups and thus strengthening the opposition camp, suggests that our opposition parties espouse the same intransigent political philosophy as PFDJ. By refusing to accept the official flag, the unmistakable opposition message is that the opposition parties stand on higher political and moral grounds and that regardless of what the general population thinks that everybody else [the public] should come around to accepting their [oppositions’] views, rather than the other way round [i.e. the opposition adopting the public’s views]. Eritrea is trapped in its current distressed situation because PFDJ remains steadfast on its belief of some twisted political and personal philosophies. We would not have been in this current political, economic, and social mess, had PFDJ shifted its views to reflect the public’s views. The opposition could be accused of the same hard headedness if they fail to adopt the general public positions on various issues. Every political organization, regardless of which end of the political spectrum they are positioned, is measured by the same weighing scale.
To address issues raised in this example, the opposition message should be based on accepting current realities, and that changing the Eritrean flag will be achieved through transparent and legal process. The same can be said about the Eritrean Constitution, Land Reforms, redrawing Zonal Administration, Martyr’s Day, and other controversial issues. In doing so, the opposition’s message will be that they are not caught up in very specific issues and that the opposition camps sole mission and priority is to introduce predictability, accountability, transparency, and democratic process into governing post-PFDJ Eritrea.
When the opposition is caught up in divisive, specific, and minor but no matter how symbolic, issues it diverts public attention from the much more important task of removing the regime, and the task of building transparent and democratic process. By NOT dwelling on specific issues, and instead by campaigning on establishing democratic processes, rule-of-law, and building institutions, our message will be that
§ ultimately it will be the Eritrean public that will decide, and that
§ the majority of issues are transitory in nature.
Naturally, the opposition camp and the public in general must continue general debates on this issues. The point here is that the seemingly burning issues of the day should not divide us because these are issues that can only be decided by the public in post-PFDJ Eritrea.
During the political campaign to remove the regime, the most important factor is to gauge public perception. If the opposition groups’ messages are different from the public’s perception and understanding, the simple equation says that either,
- opposition groups must sway public perception their way, or
- opposition groups must adopt public’s views as their own,
… but there is a time limit. If the opposition groups choose to sway public’s perceptions or views, then they must wage an urgent, strong, and effective campaign. But the most practical approach to conducting people’s struggle is to accept the peoples’ views and perceptions, which usually are based on realistic and democratic principles anyway. To the contrary, if the opposition groups insist on swaying public opinion their way over the long-run, we will be history way before then.
EDA’s Learning Curve
Some opposition leaders, as well as this writer, continue to point out that the members of the opposition parties in EDA must be given time to gel together. But the nagging question is how long should be given to the opposition political groups to smoothen out their differences. Of course, if PFDJ’s demise is to happen any time soon, a nation can’t sit in a state of paralysis until political forces reach full consensus among themselves.
EDA’s learning curve must be much shorter because,
- supposedly many of the current opposition leaders have been in those positions for decades, and thus must have plenty of experience in these matters,
- most of the opposition players know each other very well,
Thus, giving them time to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements amongst themselves is just a polite way of saying, old wounds need time to heal. Much of the effort being undertaken at this time might be considered as confidence building measures. But confidence can’t be built unless EDA becomes proactive in its opposition against the regime. Signing declarations to unite and then splitting back to their respective corners doesn’t help EDA to move down its learning curve. In the end, Eritrea is paying heavy sacrifice until these opposition leaders are able to overcome their personal ego and for their wounds to heal. If what really moves these leaders is their compassion for their people and their country, it takes only one day of self-reflection to swallow their pride and to do what they know deep in their heart must be done. The issues that is griping the whole nation is written in black-and-white, i.e. doesn’t need over-analysis nor complicated negotiation.
A suffering nation can’t wait indefinitely while EDA takes baby steps down the learning curve. Members of the EDA must burn midnight oil to ensure that they are able to patch up their differences, and then to proceed into effective and decisive actions. Otherwise, what good is their public declarations that is no more effective that, say, this article. If we were to freeze time right at this minute, what could they say was their contributions towards the Eritrean struggle for democracy and to alleviate the public’s suffering? Nothing, nada, zilch!
Current Paralysis within the Opposition
Although EDA can become an effective discussion forum for the various opposition groups (and just as importantly is its symbolic value as accepting dialogue as means of bridging differences), EDA can also, inadvertently, negate each opposition party’s own and, possibly more spirited, campaign strategies. The result is paralysis. For example, if one party actively campaigns for adopting the Constitution, another party may feel obligated to campaign against it, and thus creating ill-will among the members that may destroy EDA. To avoid any infighting, member groups may choose to refrain from engaging in any positive and public debates that could bridge their differences. If EDA is held together only through inaction, then the opposition camp will collapse into paralysis. Between inaction within a superficial united opposition and possible EDA breakup leading to more spirited opposition, it might just be better to choose the latter.
One point of clarification is that this writer advocates for open debates on any burning issues among the various opposition groups, but that EDA’s official platform [Charter] should refrain from taking positions on any contentious issues that can only be decided by the Eritrean public in democratic and transparent way. We should openly debate any contentious issues to understand and learn from one another. Ideally but which we as Eritreans lack is to vigorously debate each other, and at the end of these debates to sit down and have coffee together in amicable manner. That is what we should expect from our leaders, which is to debate each other to a point that they are at each other’s throats, then to sit down and enjoy each other as if nothing happened. The fact that they shot and eliminated each other years ago should not be used to hold a whole country hostage. If Eritrea is to become a viable nation, bygones must be bygones. That is a culture of democracy, for the sake of the people and a nation. Tolerance and swallowing hurt for greater ideals is how parliamentary systems work. Failing to learn this important lesson, Eritrean democracy will face an uphill battle. Our forefathers said, ‘mienti mogogo tihlef anchiwa’.
Our commitment to democracy is not tested during times of prosperity. We can learn great deal what awaits Eritrean democracy by observing how our opposition leaders and the general members of the public react to any given news, incidents, and activities during these challenging times. The culture of democracy [which was the subject of one of my articles] is not taught or learned – it must be embedded in our daily thinking and actions.
If EDA is to become and remain relevant, the bond between and among the various political organizations should be reinforced through shared values, visions, activities, and actions.
The other cause of opposition paralysis is that the current opposition is composed of the old generation whose network has loosed over the years. If ELF-XYZ, for example, is to campaign against the regime, its natural tendency is to seek out former members and sympathizers of ELF-XYZ. Unfortunately, and naturally by now, many have family obligations, retirement concerns, and other activities that will dissuade them from actively engaging in the campaign against the regime.
Decades ago, the Eritrean struggle was started by young people with vision and strong network that shared their views. They were able to network and organize themselves because of their proximity to each other, shared vision, and lesser family obligations. The younger generation, as we witnessed in the 1960’s and 1970’s, flooded to join the liberation movements because they were committed to certain idealism and convictions. To overcome the current paralysis within the opposition camp, the mature opposition organizations must actively and publicly engage in promoting and allowing younger generation to take up bigger responsibilities. This is only conventional wisdom.
Joining the Opposition Struggle in Year 2005
Strangely enough, and contrary to popular perception, those Eritreans that must join the current [Year 2005] opposition struggle are the opposition political groups in Diaspora. Eritreans in Eritrea, and Eritreans refugees in transitory nations are forced to engage in a struggle against the regime everyday, albeit in unorganized way. We have to understand their challenges and apprehensions, and the opposition must formulate their strategies that reflect current realities.
The current EDA campaign remains largely focused on unproductive task of defending its Charter and other side-issues such as ties to the Ethiopian regime. In the process, EDA has failed to shift attention from itself to the regime. EDA must pursue strategies and policies that locks opposition focus on the regime. After all, that should be EDA’s sole raison d’etre. If EDA is really mission-oriented - with the mission of removing the regime being the most important priority - EDA should only ask itself what it must do to win the general population to its side and to keep the focus and pressure on the regime only. Nobody is interested in self-righteous politics that can be compared to beauty – it is all in the eye of the beholder. Unlike the law of gravity, there is no magic formula in politics or social sciences. Paternalistic politics is anathema to democracy.
During any EDA meeting, EDA spends much of its time explaining its platforms. The remainder of the meeting is just more talk of ‘how bad the regime is’, which is now so imbedded in our blood nobody needs to tell us. One can measure effective campaign by the type of questions attendees ask.
Foundation of the struggle in Year 2005 and beyond include,
- Overcome politics of yesteryears. Symbolically this includes, for example, adopting the official Eritrean flag by placing it during their meetings,
- EDA should amend its Charter by eliminating many of the controversial issues that can only be decided by the public through transparent and democratic process in post-PFDJ Eritrea. Instead, the lowest common denominator for the opposition camp should be to accept transparent, accountable, and democratic process to build the future of Eritrea. None of the burning issues within the opposition camp pertain to the most important and challenging task of building the various institutions in Eritrea. The current struggle should only be peaceful and based on popular participation.
- EDA should adopt ‘Universal Bill of Rights’ as symbolic gesture towards its commitment to Eritrean basic rights and freedoms. In addition, EDA should enshrine in its Charter its belief that Eritreans are free to engage in any peaceful activities not specifically prohibited by law. Human rights and advocacy organizations and media organizations should be given equal responsibilities as political organizations to shape the future of Eritrea during the transition period and beyond. After all, these organizations are scoring more points during the current struggle than the political organizations.
- EDA should regard itself more as a bridging/coordinating organization for the various different opposition groups and its activities. Political opposition organizations are not the only ones interested or engaged in bringing about changes in Eritrea. As such, EDA should include [already established] advocacy groups and media outlets as members [or at least as associates with full rights to participate in meetings without any exceptions]. This will shift EDA’s focus from one largely aspiring to form post-PFDJ government, to one primarily engaged in changing the regime.
- EDA should exert every effort to include within its membership and leadership individuals that reflect the general opposing public. In Diaspora politics, EDA should set aside up to, say, 1/3 of the key position for young (less than 35 years old) Eritreans representing youth (esp. from Sudan an South Africa, and generally including those Group 2 identified above). Failing to include youth in the struggle to remove the regime will ensure EDA’s fading from Eritrean political scene. Second, veteran opposition leaders can’t campaign limiting tenure in power, or campaign against PIA for overstaying in power, while they themselves have been in power for some two to three decades. Symbolically, cultivating new generation means, as EDP has done, that the older generation is ready to surrender responsibilities to the young. By doing so, the older political leaders exhibit foresightedness, mature political judgment, and their preparations for handing down responsibilities in an organized manner. Effective political campaign requires them to avoid the same mistakes PFDJ is committing. To reiterate for greater emphasis, members of the EDA may be perceived as being hypocritical if they continually accuse PFDJ of not preparing the young for the future, and yet opposition political organizations also fail to vigorously cultivate young Eritreans to take up new responsibilities.
- EDA should take politically prudent approach, consistent with the public’s view and conventional wisdom, in dealing with Eritrean neighbors.
- EDA should never deviate from projecting the image that it puts Eritrean politics ahead of foreign (esp. neighbors) politics. For example, EDA’s count of statements, communiqués, or news should be, say, 5 times as many Eritrean news to 1 times foreign news. If for each EDA statement on Eritrea there is one other statement pertaining to foreign, esp. neighboring countries, politics, then one wonders about their commitment or grasp of local politics and, fairly or unfairly, brings into question their allegiance to Eritrea. Also EDA must refrain from GIC type of news reporting, which has a flavor of a semi-official outlet for Sudanese and Ethiopian accusations against Eritrea.
EDA should also be viewed as being equally accessible to all segments of the opposition. It would be serious political misjudgment if EDA makes itself available to one media outlet only, e.g. GIC, without seeking out other Eritrean opposition media outlets. Even if, supposing, other opposition media do not actively seek interview with EDA, EDA should seek them out and encourage them to interview EDA leadership. It is critical that EDA leadership is viewed as being equally accessible. The little things that EDA fails to pay attention to are the ones creating disproportional rift between the public and EDA. Failing to gauge public perception towards EDA is the little things that bring into question EDA leadership’s political judgment, and raises many doubts as to whether it will follow such favoritism into post-PFDJ Eritrea. What is disheartening is that these mistakes are not being made by young Eritreans whose mistakes can be attributed to inexperience. Instead, we are questioning the judgments of those leaders whom we expect should know much more because of their three decades or more of experience. If they couldn’t learn the little perceptions game over these three decades, what of value do they offer us?
For sake of fairness, it appears that G-15 attempted to conduct interviews with the different independent/private Eritrean media. Politicians must make the extra effort to appear impartial.
Having aligned its platforms, policies, and memberships, EDA can then proceed full throttle with its campaign. It is probably easier to engage in political campaigns once members share principles and visions. In political campaign, human interaction, human management, and confidence become the most difficult challenges and tasks to tackle. If we are able to align our principles and views, then people management becomes easier. If we fail to align them, we will only end up engaging in continuous bickering and infighting – assuring our failure to achieve our primary aim.
PART III: The Way Forward in Opposition Campaign
Having aligned our principles and views, the next step is to proceed with our plan-of-action. Ultimately a political campaign can only be effectively waged and can only be measured by the degree of direct public involvement in opposition activities,
1. Opposition in Diaspora: Having aligned our principles and views with the public as outlined above, the following actions may be followed,
a. Currently the communication between opposition groups and Eritreans in Diaspora is largely a monologue, or one-way, from the opposition groups to the public. Opposition groups issue their communiqué and the public read it on the internet. In the age of internet, the opposition groups can engage in continuous polls and surveys to gauge public views and reactions, and to receive feedback from the public. The challenge and opposition efforts should be to figure out how to encourage the public to own the slow process towards democracy.
b. The next step should be to determine how to encourage opposition network to grow at faster rate than we are experiencing today. This activity can only be achieved through our youth who now make up significant proportion of Eritreans in Diaspora [esp. those youth that arrived recently]. In general, youth have the energy and lack the excess baggage that the older political activists lack or are suffering from.
2. Opposition within Eritrea: the most practical means of organizing popular opposition within Eritrea is along the line outlined in “Bringing Down a Dictator” [available online], and effectively used by various movements throughout the last decades. The Eritrean opposition media, most effectively Eritrean radio broadcast into Eritrea, may begin slow campaign aimed at encouraging civil disobedience. A couple of examples are,
a. The general public is informed to avoid walking Kombishtato during certain times, for example – Sunday, August .., 2005 between 16:00 and 20:00
b. Shop-owners are encouraged to open shops later than usual, or close earlier than normal.
c. Civil servants could be encouraged to slow down work, to take extra extended tea breaks, etc… during certain times of a certain day.
The first few calls to civil disobedience should be subtle that the public is not exposed to the risk of indiscriminate arrest. For example, in the above examples shop owners risk more than casual Komshtato strollers who stay home as protest. The opposition can build on a recent public meetings held in Asmara, where PFDJ superficially attempted to allow the public to air out their frustrations and grievances. This is an opportune time to give the Eritrean public the needed nudge through effective public broadcast (both radio and internet).
3. In general, EDA and other opposition forces’, which includes advocacy groups’ and media groups’, resources must be pooled together for united opposition and campaign on uniform platform. It is not easy to overcome the hurt, name-calling, and backstabbing that has been taking place within the opposition camp. But we must overcome the hurt feelings and disappointments for the sake of Eritrean people and our beloved country.
a. Organized opposition should rally themselves on our universally accepted causes and engage in actions that unite us, and for EDA and the opposition camp in general to adopt the following official remembrance days,
i. August 27 – Plight of Eritrean Refugees DAY [Forcing Libyan Plane down in Sudan]
ii. September 18 – Human Rights DAY [Symbolic days for thousands arrested and in prison incommunicado ]
iii. November 5 – Plight of Youth DAY [ Adi Abeto Massacre ]
iv. December 11 – Mother’s DAY [ Aster Yohannes ]
On these days, all internet news and radio broadcasts will be pre-empted with coordinated [and coordination is critical] message reflecting the reasons for remembering the day. People should be encouraged to tell their stories days relating to the remembrance day. All songs should reflect the day. Coordinated messages from various opposition leaders, if possible video, should be broadcast on that day. No other news or articles should be available on the internet on that day [as has been done previously by some of the internet sites and news broadcasts, albeit uncoordinated with other opposition groups]. Days or weeks before each remembrance day, petitions should be organized, preferably by the various human advocacy groups [ in coordination with the political opposition groups] and forwarded to international organizations with particular interest on the issue of the day. Eritreans and members of the Swedish media have been very effective at alienating the Eritrean Embassy in Sweden through their weekly petitions for Dawit Isaak.
b. Organize youth conferences within the next few months, which is not unlike what Dr. Yonas has attempted to do. We should support such initiatives regardless of our certain political or other disagreements with him. It is never a zero-sum game if other opposition individuals or groups make an extra effort to organize a bigger opposition based on shared principles and values. Ideally, these type of conferences should be organized by young Eritreans in leadership, such as EDP’s Mussie Ephrem and Semere Kesete. These young Eritreans’ efforts will be more rewarded if engaged with their peers, rather than sitting across other opposition groups’ older leaders with excess baggage, and who may only offer these young leaders condescending attitudes than mentoring them. If each opposition party was to bring younger generation into its leadership (or those claiming to have youth wings), the communication channel between the various opposition groups would have been enhanced. For greater clarity, youth is not defined by the oldest opposition leader’s age minus ten years. Youth, and this is stretching it at one end, should be between 18-years and 35-years old. Opposition groups unable to attract younger generation should be likened to ‘dodo birds’.
c. One of the major successes of the liberation of Eritrea was its effective use of continuous music- and drama-based propaganda. The opposition has failed to capitalize on it. This is not for a lack of opposition musicians or actors/ actresses. Liberation type of music by tegadelties such as Wedi-tukul, Wedi-Sheikh, Wedi Fry, and Senait Debessai would hit home. Add in post-independence type of popular music to opposition message and no amount of communiqué can match its effectiveness. Short skits, dramas and PFDJ based comedies, even ten minutes a week, broadcast [both audio and video] over the internet can attract large number of the public into open opposition against the regime. The opposition camp must be able to inform while entertaining [as they say in the West] the general public. Read translated “Animal Farm” or “Keyih Mesobey” with two or three actors and actresses, preceded and/or followed by brief explanations. As a switch and as effective propaganda, broadcast romantic stories online and on the radio showing how normal people live in healthy societies. PFDJ could face an upswing in public demand for reform through these subtle messages. Otherwise, boredom will set in and opposition becomes that much more difficult to invigorate. The opposition camp must continually engage the public. EDA should not satisfy itself or think that it is actively engaged in opposition against the PFDJ regime just because its delegation hop from one country to another conducting seminars to the same group who already have very good grasp of the situation. The challenge should be how to bring in new crowd every time such tours are made.
d. Some may argue, and there are some merits, that opposition camp should focus their criticism on PIA only. But one could just as effectively argue that the entire PFDJ machinery should be exposed. Many of those within the PFDJ political machinery justify their submission to an oppressor as a means of saving their own skin. They hope to stay in the background, out of the limelight, and hope that when the next government is ushered in that they can somehow survive any backlash by claiming ignorance, innocence, or that they were forced to do it. In the meantime, they are prolonging the people’s misery by propping up the current regime.
It is a human nature that no one wants to be publicly accused of betraying universally accepted values. The only way to bring the entire PFDJ machinery into grinding halt is to loosen every nut and bolt that is holding it together. A coordinated opposition action could set up a dedicated website with the pictures, names, and positions of the 60 PFDJ Central Committee members and other top officials who have betrayed Eritrean people’s trust. There is no need to indulge in petty details of these individuals as some opposition websites have done. It is suffice to publish the followings only,
§ The title of each page would be just that the legacy of these individuals will forever be associated with destroying Eritrean values, killing and exiling tens of thousand of our youth, imprisoning the innocent, abandoning their 15 colleagues whom they supported and encouraged to bear the torch of reform.
§ The picture of the individual [if no picture is available then put a blank frame] , name, age, and position within the PFDJ should suffice. Other information are irrelevant for this purpose.
§ To ensure that the public continues to visit the site,
o Add new PFDJ official every four or five days to keep the public engaged,
o Add other attractions to the site, for example, new jokes every week to keep people interested enough to open it on regular basis. Narrate books and posted it on this website.
We all love to see and hear ourselves in the media – but only in a positive limelight. Conversely, no one wants to see themselves, no matter how thick-skinned one might be, advertised as betraying their own people and their martyred and imprisoned colleagues. Everybody is asking, alright PIA is probably doing it for his own legacy, but why are people like Wedi Ephrem, Alamin, Ali Said, Abdella Jabir, Zemhret, Tesfai Ghebreselassie, etc… are complying with deliberately destroying Eritrea. Why? Probably ‘ferentayo’s’ lamentation, as heard on VoL, is probably most appropriate to repeat here. Ferentayo said, ‘When I was young and had everything to look forward to, I chose to fight for my country. Why should I hold back from openly expressing my views on democracy and defending the rights of my fellow countrymen now at an age when one of my legs is already halfway in the hole [ i.e. reaching my old age].’ Ferentayo’s words can only come from a wise man. Ferentayo didn’t and couldn’t betray his fallen colleagues. Their trust is imbedded in him for life. Ferentayo is languishing behind bars for the Eritrean cause. Ferentayo could have shut his mouth and lived life like Ali Said and Zemhret, but he chose not to. These are and could only be our heroes. As Eritreans, we should not have any illusions as to who our heroes are.
PFDJ’s Strategy to weaken the opposition
PIA and PFDJ find themselves in a political quagmire they can’t free themselves. PIA can’t release political prisoners, that number in thousands, without yielding to political, social, and economic reforms. The international community will continue to shun the regime, to added suffering of the general public. The border issue has become a classic case of ‘damned if demarcated, damned if not demarcated’.
True to man’s history, PIA reckons that his only chance of salvaging his legacy as war hero lies in ensuring total destruction of Eritrea after his eventual removal from power. As shown throughout history, disorganized opposition [which are themselves victimized by the regime] rush in to occupy the seat of power abdicated by the former oppressive leader, only to plunge the whole country into chaos or near anarchy. People will, it is reckoned, will forget the economic and social hardship they suffered under the former oppressor, and lament how much better off they lived under the previous regime. Self-fulfilling prophesies for those leaders who have studied human history to govern their nations.
Some of the obvious strategies to weaken opposition are:
- PIA & PFDJ have proceeded to pre-empt any possible internal opposition through continuous ‘giffa’, locking up the entire youth population in slavery campaign, creating oppressive conditions that force youth to flee the country, closing down schools, arresting members of various religious groups, arresting and confining incommunicado suspected members of the opposition, and every other action needed to quash any possible opposition.
- PIA & PFDJ have proceeded to pre-empt any possible external opposition with a consistent evil strategy. PFDJ is engaged in a subtle campaign to create division within the Eritrean population along religious, ethnical, and other fault lines. The old game of ‘Divide and Rule’! Fortunately, this strategy has not succeeded, although few members of the opposition continue to exaggerate few incidents of these divisions. The regime is using this strategy to buy enough time to proceed with its reckless agenda.
The second sinister PFDJ campaign is to ensure that Diaspora Eritreans are not in any position to finance the opposition. More than anyone, PFDJ knows that Eritreans are very nationalistic, always ready to extend their assistance (including financial) for their national cause – as manifested during the liberation struggle. PFDJ’s sinister effort is to ensure that this financial assistance doesn’t find its way to the opposition. This is why PFDJ has endless schemes to drain every penny out-of-Diaspora Eritrean pockets. There is two-percent, endless humanitarian and national projects, housing projects, etc… Some argue that PFDJ is engaging in these activities to raise badly needed foreign currency. But PFDJ’s pattern of behavior doesn’t support this argument. If PFDJ was truly interested in raising foreign currency, even for the sake of PFDJ’s own survival, it would have put every effort to develop the immensely potential marine resources, encourage mining companies instead of scaring them by halting their operations without any explanations, pursue rapprochements with donor nations, and many other activities.
Latest examples of deliberate policy of cutting off hard currency to Eritrea are,
§ Officially asking UNMEE to remove 44 Italian UN police. As anyone can imagine, these carabieri were probably staying in Intercontinental or other major hotel, spending probably $ 150 per police per day. This translates into some $2.5 Million lost in hard currency.
§ Confiscating vehicles owned by De-mining organization, which were only few months away from completing their tasks and handing over the vehicles to the Eritrean government anyway. The donors have threatened to reduce future assistance to Eritrea as compensation. Ostensibly these vehicles were confiscated to save fuel, but when in reality these vehicles will be repainted and handed out to PFDJ lackeys the following day. Just for clarity, alienating donors to save fuel is irrational because it is a bad math when you are prepared to lose $ 5 million in assistance due to your irrational behavior just to save $ 500,000.
These are just latest examples of PFDJ’s darn best effort to strangle Eritrean economy in order to destroy it [ refer to my previous articles, “PFDJ’s Voodoo Economics” and “Clear and Present Danger” ]. PIA & PFDJ’s scenario analysis tells them that they are doomed, and salvaging their names and their legacies can only achieved by destroying Eritrea. In the process, they are hoping to take their perceived enemies down with them, unfortunately, at the expense of the lives of millions of people and an entire nation.
Those of us not assisting the opposition financially should ask a simple question, who should help the opposition? A campaign can not be waged without paying for many expenses. In my humble opinion, opposition parties are free to raise their funding from anywhere as long as their political platforms are consistent with implementing democratic government and are not perceived as endangering our sovereignty.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank members of a discussion group I belong to, whose insight and analysis has enabled me to write much of my articles. We will continue to monitor the opposition camp in order to contribute our small, and hopefully valuable, contribution towards building a free and democratic Eritrea. We will have our six-month report on EDA. Our real hope is that we won’t have to write about EDA for very long because Eritreans will have taken control of their destiny by then.
It is darkest before Dawn!
Zelalemawi Zikri N’Swaetna! [ Hidrikhum Ayresaenayon]
Berhan Hagos
July 10, 2005
